

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 00236 01 OF 03 172008Z

73

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 0236

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: THIRD REVISED DRAFT OF SPC VERIFICATION PAPER

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF THIRD REVISED DRAFT OF SPC'S PAPER ON
VERIFICATION WHICH INCLUDES CHANGES AND BRACKETS AS AGREED
DURING JAN 14 SPC MEETING. USNATO COMMENTS SEPTEL.

BEGIN TEXT

VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION IN MBFR

REPORT BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT SENIOR LEVEL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION ON VERIFICATION IN MBFR IS
CONTAINED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH READS AS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00236 01 OF 03 172008Z

FOLLOWS: "ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICA-
TION PROVISIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS,
BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION,
INCLUDING INSPECTION, SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF

THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS."

2. IN ADDITION, PARAGRAPH 32 STATES: "THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES."

3. PARAGRAPH 33 STIPULATES THAT "NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS", AND THAT "IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES" (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. IT STATES THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IS REQUIRED.

4. WITHIN THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WITH MILITARY/TECHNICAL INPUT FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSIDERING OVERT VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES AND DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS. IT RECOMMENDS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ACCEPTABLE AND FEASIBLE NEGOTIATED INSPECTION POSSIBILITIES, RECOGNISING OF COURSE THAT THE FINAL CHOICE OF MEASURES AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH IN ANY OVERALL INSPECTION SCHEME CAN BE DECIDED ONLY AS THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION DEVELOPS.

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00236 01 OF 03 172008Z

5. THE ALLIES RECOGNISE THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENTS. (IN THIS CONTEXT THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF DATA ARRIVED AT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS NEEDS TO BE SOLVED.)

ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION

6. THE ALLIES WILL SEEK OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) SINCE THEY COULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGES OF:

(A) ENABLING THOSE ALLIED COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE OR NO

NATIONAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS TO PARTICIPATE
ACTIVELY IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS;

(B) PROVIDING MORE DIRECT MBFR MONITORING FOR ALL ALLIED
COUNTRIES INVOLVED;

(C) MEETING ALLIED DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REQUIREMENTS. OVERT MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION WOULD
BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PURELY NATIONAL MEANS IN
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENTS AND IN PUBLICS
THAT THE MBFR AGREEMENTS WERE BEING OBSERVED AND
THAT VIOLATORS WOULD BE DETECTED. EVEN IF THE WESTERN
VERIFICATION PROPOSALS WERE REJECTED, THE ALLIES'
ADVOCACY OF OVERT INSPECTION WOULD BE A PUBLIC
DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR GOOD FAITH WITH REGARD TO MBFR.

(D) BEING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN NATIONAL MEANS IN PROVIDING
A BASIS FOR CONFRONTING A VIOLATOR WITH EVIDENCE OF
HIS VIOLATION. SINCE THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE GATHERED
BY SEVERAL NATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, IT
WOULD BE MORE CREDIBLE THAN IF GENERATED EXCLUSIVELY
BY NATIONAL MEANS. IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE LIKELY TO
BE RELEASABLE THAN NATIONAL EVIDENCE, SINCE THE LATTER
IS OFTEN DETECTED OR PRIMARILY EVALUATED THROUGH HIGHLY
CLASSIFIED MEANS;

(E) FILLING GAPS AND RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES IN EXISTING
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 00236 01 OF 03 172008Z

INFORMATION AND SHORTENING THE TIME REQUIRED TO MAKE
VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS;

(F) DETERRING VIOLATIONS BY INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF
THEIR DETECTION;

(G) INCREASING WARNING TIME (1), A VERY IMPORTANT CONTRIBU-
TION TO NATO'S SECURITY WHICH COULD RESULT FROM OVERT
VERIFICATION. THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME
CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED PRECISELY. ANY ADDITIONAL
WARNING TIME WOULD BE OF VALUE IN MANAGING A CRISIS
SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

(H) INDICATING WILLINGNESS OF THE TWO SIDES TO BE MORE
OPEN ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THEREBY ENHANCING
EAST-WEST CONFIDENCE.

RECIPROCITY

7. ANY NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES AGREED UPON WOULD
HAVE TO BE APPLIED RECIPROCALLY. IN GENERAL IT SEEMS UNLIKELY
THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT ON THEIR TERRITORY
ARRANGEMENTS SO INTRUSIVE THAT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION WOULD HARM

WESTERN INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, EACH POSSIBLE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY AGREED REDUCTION MEASURES, MUST BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ITS APPLICATION ON ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE (2).

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 00236 02 OF 03 171915Z

73

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 0236

NON-INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

8. NO OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE AND LEGAL ACTIVITIES OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTORATES ON THE ALLIED TERRITORY CONCERNED WOULD NOT PER SE NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

POSSIBLE MEASURES OUTSIDE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

9. TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED TO APPLY OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR, WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 17 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL).)

STAFFING OF INSPECTORATES

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00236 02 OF 03 171915Z

10. SUBJECT TO FURTHER ALLIED STUDIES, INSPECTORATES IN THE CENTRAL REGION WOULD BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM THOSE NATIONS WITH FORCES OR TERRITORIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA; FLANK COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY INSPECTORATES WHICH MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION (AND ANY AGREEMENTS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION WOULD CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR THE ASSIGNING OF ALLIED (INCLUDING HOST COUNTRY) LIAISON OFFICERS TO WARSAW PACT INSPECTION TEAMS ON ALLIED TERRITORY, AND VICE VERSA).

ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

11. NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY THE ALLIES SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY NATO. POLICY GUIDANCE SHOULD EMANATE FROM THE COUNCIL AND OVERALL TECHNICAL DIRECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY A COMPETENT HEADQUARTERS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL.

12. THE PRODUCT OF NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

13. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO VERIFICATION TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS LINKED TO REDUCTION MEASURES ON WHOSE SUBSTANCE THEY MAY HAVE UALREADY AGREED. THEREFORE, THE ACCEPTABILITY OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WOULD BE INCREASED IF THEY WERE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS.

14. INDEPENDENTLY OF THE TABLING OF ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE AT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE WEST WANTS OVERT VERIFICATION AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

15. VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AGREED FOR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ARE LIKELY TO INFLUENCE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECOND PHASE. SOME VERIFICATION MEASURES (E.G. VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS) WOULD NORMALLY EXTEND INTO AND
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00236 02 OF 03 171915Z

BEYOND THE SECOND PHASE. THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE PUT ON NOTICE THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES CHOSEN FOR THE FIRST PAHSE MAY NEED TO BE ALTERED OR EXPANDED IN THE SECOND PHASE.

III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES

VERIFICATION OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS

16. AN ALLIED PROPOSAL TO INSPECT OBSERVANCE OF PRE-

REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD FURTHER DIMINISH THEIR NEGOTIABILITY. PROPOSAL OF SUCH A MEASURE COULD IMPEDE OVERALL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PREJUDICE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO OTHER MORE ESSENTIAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. (HOWEVER, NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS SHOULD BE ASSURED IN ANY MBFR AGREEMENT.)

VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS

17. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF WITHDRAWALS IN AN IMPORTANT ALLIED OBJECTIVE, AND HIGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ITS SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD INVOLVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS OBJECTIVE SEEMS TECHNICALLY SOUND AND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO INVOLVE NATO IN UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY.

VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

18. THIS OBJECTIVE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIES AS VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS. IT COULD INVOLVE THE ASSIGNMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWALS. (THE INSPECTORATES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS CONTINUOUSLY FOR AS LONG AS THE MBFR AGREEMENT WAS IN FORCE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THEM TO BE IN THE AREA AT ALL TIMES.) THESE INSPECTORATES WOULD IN ADDITION TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, HAVE ALL OF THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE ACCURACY IN THE VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, PARTICULARLY IN PERSONNEL, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE IN BROAD TERMS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 00236 02 OF 03 171915Z

VERIFICATION OF COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES

19. IN NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANCE OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS TO THE POSSIBLE VERIFICATION OF STABILISING MEASURES. (TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT INSPECTION OF WHATEVER STABILISING MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED.)

IV. SPECIFIC MEASURES

20. ASSESSMENTS IN THIS SECTION WERE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT ON "NEGOTIATED INSP
SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 00236 03 OF 03 171939Z

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 0236

24. THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONCEDE 21(B) IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE FULFILLING THEIR SIDE OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE 21(A) IS MORE QUESTIONABLE, SINCE THE ABOVE-CITED ADVANTAGES TO THE WEST OF MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS DISADVANTAGES BY THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING BOT IS NOT EXCLUDED.

25. CONCLUSION: BECAUSE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF MOBILE TEAMS AND FOR REASONS OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS, THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE 21(A) EXCLUSIVELY. ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE, SHOULD THE ALLIES ADVANCE 21(B) TO THE OTHER SIDE.

B. USE OF MOBILE TEAMS AND/OR FIXED POSTS (STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS) TO MONITOR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

26. THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER SUGGESTS A MINIMUM OF 10 TWO-MAN MOBILE TEAMS IN EAST GERMANY, 7 TO 8 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN CZECHO-SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00236 03 OF 03 171939Z

SLOVAKIA, AND 7 TO 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN POLAND. HOWEVER, A NATO STUDY (4) HAS ADVOCATED THE MUCH LARGER TOTAL OF 130 TWO-MAN TEAMS BASED ON 20 DIFFERENT SB-HEADQUARTERS. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THESE TWO SUGGESTIONS, FURTHER STUDY IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED. IT WOULD

BE IN NATO'S PURELY MILITARY INTEREST TO ACHIEVE A MAXIMUM DENSITY OF TEAMS. HOWEVER, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTION PERSONNEL WHICH COULD BE TOLERATED ON ALLIED TERRITORY FROM A DOMESTIC POLITICAL POINT OF

VIEW, KEEPING IN MIND THAT THIS VERIFICATION PROVISION WOULD PROBABLY LAST AS LONG AS THE MBFR AGREEMENT REMAINED IN FORCE.

27. STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS (5) COULD BE USED IN PLACE OF OR AS A SUPPLEMENT TO MOBILE TEAMS. AS THEIR NAMES IMPLY, THEY WOULD BE LOCATED PRIMARILY AT KEY CROSSING POINTS ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND AT MAJOR TRANSPORTATION HUBS WITHIN THE AREA. HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE TO STATIC POSTS FOR THE MILITARY REASONS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 22.

28. POLITICALLY, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE TO FIXED POSTS SINCE THE LATTER, AND PARTICULARLY THE PERIMETER POSTS, COULD BE INTERPRETED AS DELINEATING A SPECIAL REDUCTIONS ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

29. MOBILE TEAMS MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE THAN FIXED POSTS, SINCE THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT PERCEIVE OF THE FORMER AS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DECEPTION AND CIRCUMVENTION. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS APPEAR NEGOTIABLE.

30. CONCLUSION: (THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS, AS OUTLINED IN B ABOVE, AND SHOULD NEGOTIATE ADEQUATE ACCESS BY THESE TEAMS TO KEY TRANSPORTATION ROUTES INTO AND WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SINCE PERIMETER POSTS AND CHOKE POINT POSTS ARE A VERY POOR SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEAMS, THEY SHOULD BE PROPOSED TO THE OTHER SIDE ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE TO BE NON-NEGOTIABLE.)

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00236 03 OF 03 171939Z

OR

(THE ALLIES COULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS. ALSO, STATIC PERIMETER POSTS COULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.)

C. "OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL", I.E. THAT MANNED AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS BE USED TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

31. THE SYSTEMS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF SENSORS, MOSTLY PHOTOGRAPHIC. INSPECTORS WOULD FLY ABOARD AIRCRAFT BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE (NORMALLY TO THE INSPECTED COUNTRY), UTILISE SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE, AND BE ACCOMPANIED BY LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. THE FLIGHTS WOULD ORIGINATE IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY, ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS WOULD BE GIVEN, AND THEY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON PRESCRIBED ROUTES AND ALTITUDES. NATO SHOULD AIM FOR MAXIMUM FLIGHT FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH MUTUAL POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, FLIGHT SAFETY AND THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

32. THE MAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER GROUND OBSERVATION LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO COVER LARGE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS IN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. A TECHNICAL DRAWBACK IN RELATION TO GROUND OBSERVATION IS THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF AIRBORNE SYSTEMS TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS. IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA BAD WEATHER COULD FREQUENTLY PRECLUDE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY. THIS MEASURE WOULD BE A COMPLEMENT TO GROUND OBSERVATION - NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR IT.

3. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES: THE APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL NATO COUNTRIES IN THIS FORM OF SURVEILLANCE, AS THE LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY IS WITHIN THEIR MEANS. THIS PARTICIPATION WOULD TEND TO FOSTER PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY CONFIDENCE IN THE OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES: THE GROUND PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE MIGHT BE EXPENSIVE. ALSO, PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT OBJECT TO WARSAW PACT AERIAL INSPECTION OF THEIR TERRITORY ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 00236 03 OF 03 171939Z

TOO ENCOMPASSING AND INTRUSIVE. WHILE GROUND INSPECTORS COULD BE LIMITED LARGELY TO VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH MBFR AGREEMENTS, AERIAL INSPECTORS COULD, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, GLEAN INTELLIGENCE ON A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OVER VERY LARGE AREAS. APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE OVER ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF LIMITED AS DESCRIBED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THIS SECTION.

34. WARSAW PACT GOVERNMENTS MIGHT HAVE SIMILAR OBJECTIONS TO NATO AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THEIR TERRITORY. BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONCERN OF BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE INTRUSIVENESS OF THIS MEASURE, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE IF PRESENTED IN A CAREFULLY DEFINED FORM WHICH EMPHASISES ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.

35. CONCLUSION: DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER ADVANCING A CAREFULLY DEFINED "OPEN SKIES" PROPOSAL, THE DETAILS OF WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. THE MEASURE WOULD COMPLEMENT GROUND OBSERVATION TEAMS - NOT SERVE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THEM.

D. USE OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS (MLMS) TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST-REDUCTION FOR

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